European sovereign-debt crisis
The European sovereign debt crisis is an ongoing financial crisis that has made it difficult or impossible for some countries in the euro area to re-finance their government debt without the assistance of third parties.
From late 2009, fears of a sovereign debt crisis developed among investors as a result of the rising government debt levels around the world together with a wave of downgrading of government debt in some European states. Concerns intensified in early 2010 and thereafter, leading Europe's finance ministers on 9 May 2010 to approve a rescue package worth €750 billion aimed at ensuring financial stability across Europe by creating the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). In October 2011 and February 2012, the eurozone leaders agreed on more measures designed to prevent the collapse of member economies. This included an agreement whereby banks would accept a 53.5% write-off of Greek debt owed to private creditors, increasing the EFSF to about €1 trillion, and requiring European banks to achieve 9% capitalisation. To restore confidence in Europe, EU leaders also agreed to create a common fiscal union including the commitment of each participating country to introduce a balanced budget amendment.
While sovereign debt has risen substantially in only a few eurozone countries, it has become a perceived problem for the area as a whole. Nevertheless, the European currency has remained stable. As of mid-November 2011, the euro was even trading slightly higher against the bloc's major trading partners than at the beginning of the crisis. The three countries most affected, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, collectively account for six percent of the eurozone's gross domestic product (GDP).
Causes: The European sovereign debt crisis has resulted from a combination of complex factors, including the globalization of finance; easy credit conditions during the 2002–2008 period that encouraged high-risk lending and borrowing practices; international trade imbalances; real-estate bubbles that have since burst; slow economic growth in 2008 and thereafter; fiscal policy choices related to government revenues and expenses, particularly high entitlement spending, see welfare state; and approaches used by nations to bailout troubled banking industries and private bondholders, assuming private debt burdens or socializing losses.
One narrative describing the causes of the crisis begins with the significant increase in savings available for investment during the 2000–2007 period when the global pool of fixed income securities increased from approximately $36 trillion in 2000 to $70 trillion by 2007. This "Giant Pool of Money" increased as savings from high-growth developing nations entered global capital markets. Investors searching for higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds sought alternatives globally. The temptation offered by such readily available savings overwhelmed the policy and regulatory control mechanisms in country after country as global fixed income investors searched for yield, generating bubble after bubble across the globe. While these bubbles have burst causing asset prices (e.g., housing and commercial property) to decline, the liabilities owed to global investors remain at full price, generating questions regarding the solvency of governments and their banking systems.
How each European country involved in this crisis borrowed and invested the money varies. For example, Ireland's banks lent the money to property developers, generating a massive property bubble. When the bubble burst, Ireland's government and taxpayers assumed private debts. In Greece, the government increased its commitments to public workers in the form of extremely generous pay and pension benefits. For more information on Greece default please check Greece default. Iceland's banking system grew enormously, creating debts to global investors ("external debts") several times GDP.
The interconnection in the global financial system means that if one nation defaults on its sovereign debt or enters into recession putting some of the external private debt at risk, the banking systems of creditor nations face losses. For example, in October 2011 Italian borrowers owed French banks $366 billion (net). Should Italy be unable to finance itself, the French banking system and economy could come under significant pressure, which in turn would affect France's creditors and so on. This is referred to as financial contagion. Another factor contributing to interconnection is the concept of debt protection. Institutions entered into contracts called credit default swaps (CDS) that result in payment should default occur on a particular debt instrument (including government issued bonds). But, since multiple CDS's can be purchased on the same security, it is unclear what exposure each country's banking system now has to CDS.
Some politicians, notably Angela Merkel, have sought to attribute some of the blame for the crisis to hedge funds and other speculators stating that "institutions bailed out with public funds are exploiting the budget crisis in Greece and elsewhere". Although some financial institutions clearly profited from the growing Greek government debt in the short run, there was a long lead up to the crisis.
Rising government debt levels: In 1992, members of the European Union signed the Maastricht Treaty, under which they pledged to limit their deficit spending and debt levels. However, a number of EU member states, including Greece and Italy, were able to circumvent these rules and mask their deficit and debt levels through the use of complex currency and credit derivatives structures. The structures were designed by prominent U.S. investment banks, who received substantial fees in return for their services and who took on little credit risk themselves thanks to special legal protection for derivatives counterparties.
A number of "appalled economists" have condemned the popular notion in the media that rising debt levels of European countries were caused by excess government spending. According to their analysis, increased debt levels are due to the large bailout packages provided to the financial sector during the late-2000s financial crisis, and the global economic slowdown thereafter. The average fiscal deficit in the euro area in 2007 was only 0.6% before it grew to 7% during the financial crisis. In the same period the average government debt rose from 66% to 84% of GDP. The authors also stressed that fiscal deficits in the euro area were stable or even shrinking since the early 1990s. US economist Paul Krugman named Greece as the only country where fiscal irresponsibility is at the heart of the crisis.
